Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval HistoryVinogradoff, Paul
History
Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History
Vinogradoff, Paul
Villeinage -- England -- History -- To 1500
There has been some debate on the question whether the lord could sell
his villains. It has been urged that we have no traces of such
transactions during the feudal period, and that therefore personal
serfdom did not exist even in law[293]. It can be pointed out, on the
other side, that deeds of sale conveying villains apart from their
tenements, although rare, actually exist. The usual form of
enfranchisement was a deed of sale, and it cannot be argued that this
treatment of manumission is a mere relic of former times, because both
the Frank and the Saxon manumissions of the preceding period assume a
different shape; they are not effected by sale. The existing evidence
entitles one to maintain that a villain could be lawfully sold, with all
his family, his _sequela_, but that in practice such transactions were
uncommon[294]. The fact is a most important one in itself; the whole
aspect of society and of its work would have been different if the
workman had been a saleable commodity passing easily from hand to hand.
Nothing of the kind is to be noticed in the medieval system. There is no
slave market, and no slave trade, nothing to be compared with what took
place in the slave states of North America, or even to the restricted
traffic in Russia before the emancipation. The reason is a curious one,
and forcibly suggested by a comparison between the cases when such trade
comes into being, and those when it does not. The essential condition
for commercial transfer is a protected market, and such a market existed
more or less in every case when men could be bought and sold. An
organised state of some kind, however slightly built, is necessary as a
shelter for such transfer. The feudal system proved more deficient in
this respect than very raw forms of early society, which make up for
deficiencies in State protection by the facilities of acquiring slaves
and punishing them. The landowner had enough political independence to
prevent the State from exercising an efficient control over the
dependent population, and for this very reason he had to rely on his own
force and influence to keep those dependents under his sway. Personal
dependence was locally limited, and not politically general, if one may
use the expression. It was easy for the villain to step out of the
precincts of bondage; it was all but impossible for the lord to treat
his man as a transferable chattel. The whole relation got to be
regulated more by internal conditions than by external pressure, by a
customary _modus vivendi_, and not by commercial and state-protected
competition. This explains why in some cases political progress meant a
temporary change for the worse, as in some parts of Germany and in
Russia: the State brought its extended influence to bear in favour of
dependence, and rendered commercial transactions possible by its
protection. In most cases, however, the influence of moral, economical,
and political conceptions made itself felt in the direction of freedom,
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