War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus ChristDodge, David Low
Religion
War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ
Dodge, David Low
Peace -- Religious aspects -- Christianity; War -- Religious aspects -- Christianity
_Answer._ This is an objection founded on an undefinable something aside
from divine precept; yet as some terms in it have been much used in
polemic divinity by men of eminent talents and piety, whose praise is in
the churches, I think it neither proper nor modest to dissent from so
high authority without offering some reasons. I shall, therefore, make a
few general observations on what is called the moral law, the eternal
rule of right and wrong, or the nature of things; all of which phrases,
I believe, have been occasionally used by eminent writers as conveying
the same ideas.
I cannot agree with such as suppose that a moral law or nature of things
exists independently of the will of God and is the common law of God and
man. It appears to me as inconsistent to suppose a law to exist without
a lawgiver as to suppose a world to exist without a creator. If God is
the only eternal and independent Being in the universe, and if all
things are the work of his power and goodness, then the supposition that
an eternal law exists independently of him appears to me to be absurd,
as on this supposition there exists a law without a lawgiver and an
effect without a cause. If God is not the author of all things, then
there must be more than one eternal cause of things.
To suppose that the reason and fitness of things independently of the
will of God, either in his works, his providence, or word, can be a rule
of man's duty appears to me as inconsistent as to suppose that men might
institute divine worship from such fitness of things independently of
the existence of God; for the will of God to man seems as necessary to
lay a foundation of moral obligation and to direct man's obedience as
the existence of God is necessary to lay a foundation of religious
worship. Should it be asked whether the laws of God are not founded on
the eternal nature and fitness of things, I would answer that such a
supposition appears to me no more reasonable than to suppose that his
power is founded on the eternal capacity of things; for the capacity of
things has just as much reality and eternity in it to found the
omnipotence of God upon, as the reason and nature of things have to
found his infinite wisdom or justice upon.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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