Mr. SEELEY. Yes, sir. Mr. COLEMAN. Did you send for the security file? Mr. SEELEY. No, sir; I did not. Mr. COLEMAN. Why wouldn't you send for the security file if you get a telegram from a security agency saying that the gentleman who was down at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City is the same guy who in 1959 attempted to defect? Mr. SEELEY. I looked at this report strictly from a passport office point of view. The significance which, of course, might have great intelligence significance, had little or no significance insofar as any action that we would take in the Passport Office is concerned. Mr. COLEMAN. Why would that be, sir? Mr. SEELEY. Well, we have to have some basis under our regulations to take any action. Mr. COLEMAN. I mean why, if you get information which you can immediately realize may have intelligence significance, why wouldn't you look at it from a point of view of intelligence? Mr. SEELEY. Well, I am working for the Passport Office. Certainly, if I saw something that I could do something about, I would take whatever action I thought was necessary. Mr. COLEMAN. Why didn't you, for example, write a letter to the FBI saying that this fellow is down in Mexico City, are you interested, or do you want to see the file? Mr. SEELEY. Well, I would say the probability is that a copy of this was apparently furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. COLEMAN. And you noted that, I take it, at the time of reviewing the file? Mr. SEELEY. I have no independent recollection that I did. Mr. COLEMAN. But the fair assumption is that you did? Mr. SEELEY. I would assume that. Mr. COLEMAN. I take it that is also the reason why you didn't notify the CIA, because the telegram had come from the CIA? Mr. SEELEY. Yes; from the CIA. Mr. COLEMAN. When you looked at the file, did you know or were you aware after looking at the file that Oswald in June 1963 had been issued a passport? Mr. SEELEY. I presume I was. The passport is the next item there, and I am sure that I looked at it and saw that he did have a passport. Mr. COLEMAN. Did you after you looked at it say to yourself "can we revoke this passport?" Mr. SEELEY. I am sure that is why I looked at it. I am sure of that, Mr. Coleman, that I looked at it with that view in mind, if there was any action to be taken of that sort. Mr. COLEMAN. Did you know that he had defected or attempted to defect in 1959? Mr. SEELEY. Yes, sir. Mr. COLEMAN. Did you know that when he attempted to defect that he had indicated that he was going to pass some radar information to the Russians if they gave him citizenship? Mr. SEELEY. Yes, sir. Mr. COLEMAN. Did you know that the Soviet desk had indicated in 1961 or 1962 that it would be to the interests of the United States to get him out of Russia and back to the United States? Mr. SEELEY. Yes, sir.