As to the results of the fighting, the armour fully justified its use. The Austrian ships were struck several times by the heavy Italian shot and shells, but not once did the Italian projectiles penetrate both the armour and the backing, while for the most part the injuries caused by them were insignificant. The Italians lost two ironclads, and a third, the _Affondatore_, went down a few days afterwards as the result of the knocking about the Austrians gave her. But the injuries which caused the loss of these three Italian vessels were received below the water-line. Their armour was badly battered, but the ships themselves were little the worse. The 4-inch armour of one of the Italian ships was penetrated, but the backing prevented the shot going farther. The Austrians did not lose one ship, and on their armoured ships they had only three men killed, while on the wooden ships they lost thirty-eight killed and one hundred and thirty-eight wounded. The Italian losses are unknown, as a number of men were drowned when the two ironclads went under. Even after the Italians were defeated they were still as strong as their opponents, but dared not attack them; while the Austrian commander deemed discretion the better part of rashness, and, contenting himself with having compelled the Italians to retire from Lissa, was confident that they would not attempt to attack him after the losses they had sustained, which had rendered them even more hopelessly disorganised than before the battle, if that were possible. The Italians, in spite of the vainglorious boasting in which they were pleased to indulge, were in no mood for another sea-fight. They were short now of ammunition, and their sailors were completely disheartened. Some of the commanders and all the crews showed extraordinary bravery in maintaining the fight when the circumstances, though not the odds, were against them, but the other commanders were remarkable for incompetence and some of them for cowardice, for they had no plan of action, one at least fled as soon as the shooting began, and one or two others were careful to keep out of harm’s way. The main lessons drawn from this engagement were that armour was indispensable in protecting a ship from the effects of hostile shot, and that the gun must remain the chief weapon of naval warfare. The advantage given to a numerically weaker side by superiority in organisation and efficiency had been too often demonstrated in previous engagements in the world’s history to render attractive a repetition of the lesson, but it is to be feared that the need of such lessons at frequent intervals has not yet passed. It also showed that big ships and gigantic guns are not of much account if the men who are to use them are untrained, and that no matter how heavy the guns and far-reaching their range they are of little use if the gunners miss nearly every time. The Austrian concentration of fire upon a given spot, even though the firing were