had officers trained in the English Navy, and there were also a few English officers serving with the Turkish fleet. The vessels on which these officers were engaged were managed as warships should be, but those which were left to the tender mercies of the Turkish officers were sadly neglected, and discipline on board was conspicuous by its absence. This was one reason why the Russians were successful so frequently in their surprise attacks. Then, when they were disagreeably aroused to the presence of the enemy the Turks usually distinguished themselves by shooting very wildly and widely, and before they knew what they were about the Russians had dashed in and torpedoed the Turkish ship. In spite of the preponderance of Turkish ships, they only came to close quarters once with a Russian ship, and that was a converted merchantman. It is probably a good thing for the Turks that the Russian naval force was so weak, for had it been stronger the Russians would not have hesitated to attack the Turks, and when the attack was over there would probably have been a repetition of the story of the Battle of Sinope and the destruction of the Ottoman fleet which preceded the Crimean War. The ships under English officers would have given a good account of themselves, especially with such men as Hobart Pacha in command; as it was, the English did their best, but their efforts were negatived by the incompetence and indifference of their Turkish colleagues. The Turkish warships on the Danube began the roll of Ottoman naval disasters in this war, the first to be lost being the _Lutfi Djelil_, launched at Bordeaux in 1868. She was engaged with a Russian battery at Braila, during the attack on the Turkish squadron, and the engagement was proceeding fiercely when a shell struck the vessel and blew her up. As torpedoes and mines were also being employed by the Russians her destruction has sometimes been ascribed to one of these.