The Delaware was still filled with floating ice. Large masses were banked within its curves, so that retreat across the river, in the presence of a powerful adversary, would be impracticable. And yet, he had not hesitated to take position at Trenton, on the east bank of the river. To have remained on the west bank would have made it impossible for him to prevent Cornwallis from passing down the east bank to Philadelphia, or at least from driving both Cadwallader and Mifflin to that city, in disorder. To have retired his own army to Philadelphia, would have been the abandonment of New Jersey, and of all the prestige of his exploit on Christmas night. He resolved to save his army; and leave Philadelphia to the contingencies of the campaign. If compelled to fight, he would choose the ground; but he did not intend to fight under conditions that would force him to abandon the aggressive campaign which he had planned. During December, he had secured a careful reconnoissance of the roads to Brunswick, had learned the strength of its garrison, and formed an estimate of the value of the large magazines which General Howe had located at that post. He believed that a quick dash would secure their destruction or capture. While awaiting the advance of Cornwallis, he called a council of officers, and this bold strategic movement was fully indorsed by them. But no time was to be lost. The initiative must be taken before the armies were brought to a deadly struggle for the very ground already occupied by his camp. Battle must be deferred until another day. The baggage-wagons which accompanied the commands of Cadwallader and Mifflin, now parked in the rear of the army, were moved to its extreme right, toward Princeton, and the army waited. Washington visited the advance posts, where Greene was on the alert, and being advised by him that he could keep Cornwallis back until late in the afternoon, or until night, returned to headquarters. The advance of Cornwallis was so successively annoyed by the outposts, that he halted until additional regiments joined him. Greene opened fire with his two guns, under orders from Washington to “so check the enemy as to prevent battle until the next day”; and Cornwallis again came to a halt. He knew that the Delaware River was behind Washington, and felt sure of his prey. Already the British had made a tiresome march; and at this second halt, orders were sent back to Princeton to bring up a part of the force left at that place. Cornwallis had not been neglectful of his flanks, however, but sent skirmishers along the Assanpink, and even threw both shot and shell into the woods in the direction of the American lines.