It certainly was General Howe’s impression that Washington would have such fears for the safety of Philadelphia as to risk an action south of the Raritan. On the succeeding fifth of July he wrote to Lord Germaine, that his “only object was to bring the American army to a general action.” But Washington only strengthened his works, and never believed that Howe was making Philadelphia the object of his movement. The following letter explains his views: “Had they designed for the Delaware, on the first instance, they probably would have made a secret, rapid march of it, and not have halted as they have done, to awaken our attention and give us time for obstructing them. Instead of this, they have only advanced to a position to facilitate an attack on our right: which is the part they have the greatest likelihood of injuring us in. In addition to this consideration, they have come out as light as possible, in leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges, at Brunswick, which plainly contradicts the idea of their pushing for the Delaware.” On the morning of the nineteenth, Howe suddenly returned to Brunswick. Greene and Maxwell were advanced by Washington to a position between Brunswick and Amboy. Howe marched early in the morning of the twenty-second. Morgan and Wayne drove in the Hessian rear-guard upon the main army, after a spirited skirmish. It had been Greene’s intention to have Maxwell strike the column near Piscataway. Washington advanced his entire army as far as Quibbletown, now Newmarket, upon the advice of his officers that the retreat was genuine; yet not without a suspicion, afterward verified, that the whole was a _ruse_ to entice him from his stronghold.