United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Campaigns; Washington, George, 1732-1799
Washington was also fully advised of the character and extent of
Clinton’s retiring column, and of the opportunity which the country
afforded for breaking it up. Haste was the need of Clinton. His delay,
however slight, was Washington’s opportunity. Clinton reached
Haddonfield the same day. The militia of Maxwell made a short
resistance, and then retired to Mount Holy Pass. The increased British
vanguard compelled him to fall back; but the destruction of bridges and
interposed obstructions, together with the excessive summer heat, made
the march of the British troops one of intense strain and exhaustion.
And yet, Clinton used such vigor in pressing forward to anticipate more
formidable obstructions, that he reached Crosswicks before the
destruction of the bridge at that point was complete; and on the morning
of the twenty-fourth, his army crossed the creek. The column of
Lieutenant-General Knyphausen went into camp at Imlay’s Town; while that
of Clinton occupied Allentown, and thereby effectively covered the
advance division in case of an American attack from the north. At this
point, he learned that Washington had already crossed the Delaware, and
that the northern army was expected to unite with that of the American
Commander-in-Chief. Such a combination, just then, would render a direct
retreat to New York, via Princeton and Brunswick, extremely hazardous,
if not impossible. With the promptness which characterized him, Sir
Henry Clinton consolidated his baggage and sent it in advance under
Lieutenant-General Knyphausen; placed the second division in light
marching order, under his own personal command, in the rear, and took
the Monmouth route to the sea. (See map.)
Washington was quickly advised of this organic change in the British
formation, and acted instantly. He had crossed the Delaware River at
Coryell’s Ferry, forty miles above Philadelphia, without assurance of
the definite purpose of his adversary. Any other route of march by
Clinton than by Brunswick, would prevent him from receiving military
support from New York, and hold him to the limit of supplies with which
he started from Philadelphia. When, therefore, couriers from Maxwell
notified Washington of Clinton’s diversion eastward, from Crosswicks, it
was evident that Clinton would take no risks of battle in reaching New
York, or some port on the coast accessible by a British fleet.
[Illustration: Battle of Monmouth.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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