As soon as the French squadron of Count d’Estaing sailed from New York, Washington instructed General Sullivan, then in command at Providence, R.I., to summon the New England militia to his aid for a combined attack upon Newport; assigned Generals Greene and Lafayette to the command of divisions; and ordered the brigades of Varnum and Glover to report to Lafayette. These officers had served with Greene before Boston, and Varnum was a member of Greene’s old company, the Kentish Guards, which marched with him to Boston at the outbreak of war. The proposed coöperation of French troops also made the assignment of General Lafayette equally judicious. The British garrison consisted of six thousand troops under Major-General Pigot. On the fifth of August two French frigates entered the harbor, and the British burned seven of their own frigates with which they had controlled the waters, to avoid their capture. Details of the siege of Newport, except as Washington bore relations to its progress and its ultimate failure, are not within the purpose of this narrative. It was unfortunate that General Sullivan so long detained the French troops on shipboard; where, as one of their officers wrote, they had been “cooped up” for more than five months. Their prompt landing would certainly have averted the subsequent disaster; as storms of unprecedented fury soon after swept the coast, with almost equal distress to the land forces and those on the sea. In General Washington’s letter, advising of the departure of Admiral Howe from New York for Newport, he thus forecast the future: “Unless the fleet have advices of reenforcements off the coast, it can only be accounted for on the principle of desperation, stimulated by a hope of finding you divided in your operations against Rhode Island.” The American force was about ten thousand men. The tenth of the month had been specifically designated for a joint movement; but General Sullivan, without notifying the Count d’Estaing, anticipated it by a day, and failed. Count d’Estaing was a lieutenant-general in the French army; but agreed to waive his rank, and serve under Lafayette. The report was current at that time, that ill-feeling arose between General Sullivan and Count d’Estaing because of the precipitate action of General Sullivan on this occasion. On the contrary, Count d’Estaing understood that but two thousand troops were in the movement. He promptly called upon General Sullivan to consult as to further operations; and in a Report to Congress used this language, alike creditable to his judgment and his candor: “Knowing that there are moments which must be eagerly seized upon in war, I was cautious of blaming any overthrow of plans, which nevertheless astonished me, and which, in fact, merits in my opinion only praise; although accumulated circumstances might have rendered the consequences very unfortunate.”