United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783 -- Campaigns; Washington, George, 1732-1799
The fluctuations of numbers in the American army seemed very largely to
depend upon its vicinity to endangered sections. Remoteness from the
seaboard induced indifference to expenditures for the navy, because
British ships could not operate on land; and seaboard towns, which were
constantly in peril, insisted upon retaining their able-bodied militia
within easy reach, until armed vessels could be built and assigned for
their protection. The same unpatriotic principle of human nature
affected all supplies of food and clothing. It has already been noticed
that Washington was profoundly grieved that country people courted the
British markets of New York, and that British gold was of such mighty
weight in the balance of “stay-at-home comfort,” against personal
experience in some distant camp. Starvation and suffering could not fail
to arouse resistance to their constraints. The condition of the army was
one of protracted agony. Lafayette wrote home to his wife as follows:
“Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer one-tenth
part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens, to support hunger,
nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the
condition of our soldiers,—the hardiest and most patient that are to be
found in the world.”
Marshall states the case fairly when he asserts that “it was not easy to
persuade the military, that their brethren in civil life were unable to
make greater exertions in support of the war, or, that its burdens could
not be more equally borne.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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