The assignment of General Greene to the command of that department was designed by Washington, for the purpose of initiating a vigorous campaign against all posts occupied by British garrisons, and gradually to clear that country of the presence of British troops. He had great confidence in such men as Marion, Sumter, Hampton, and other partisan leaders, who were perpetually on the alert, by night and by day, for opportunities to repress royalist risings, and harass the enemy at every possible point of contact. It was very natural, then, to overestimate the British successes at Savannah and Charleston, and even to assume that the British army would be uniformly equal to active campaign service, and would not find it difficult to maintain supplies in the field. In view of the condition of roads, water-courses, swamps, and the limited agricultural improvements of those times, it is greatly to the credit of the British officers that so much was accomplished by them, in the face of the partisan operations above noticed. Washington appreciated this condition fully; urged the Southern governors to renewed activity, and furnished General Greene with instructions respecting what he regarded as the final campaign of the war. The _first_ element of success which he enjoined as a duty was “to avoid battle with fresh British troops, just out of garrison, and therefore in complete readiness for action.” The _second_ injunction was, “so far as possible, to give a partisan or skirmish character to engagements where inferior numbers could keep their adversaries under constant and sleepless apprehension of attack.” The _third_ was, “to utilize and control streams, swamps, and woods, where the bayonet and artillery could not be successfully employed by British troops.” The _fourth_ principle of action was characteristic of Washington’s early experience, and was exemplified throughout the war—“never to halt, over night, without making artificial protection against surprise; and to surprise the enemy so far as practicable, whenever all conditions seem to render such surprise impossible.” Cæsar’s habitual intrenchments, upon a halt, were types of Washington’s methods; and the Crimean War made more impressive than ever the value of slight, temporary cover for troops in the field. The _camp-kettle_, the _powder_ and _lead_, the _pick_ and the _spade_, were Washington’s indispensable tools.