Washington held his enemy at bay. But upon the same reasoning which enforced his first occupation of Brooklyn Heights, boldly facing the British army at its first landing, he resolved to evacuate the position without decisive battle. His fixed policy,—to avoid positively determining issues which were beyond his immediate mastery, so as to wear out his adversary by avoiding his strokes, and thereby gain vantage-ground for turning upon him when worn out, over-confident, and off his guard,—had its illustration now. His army was not versed in tactical movements upon a large scale, and was largely dependent for its success upon the supervising wisdom with which its undoubted courage could be made available in the interests of the new Nation. The retreat from Brooklyn was a signal achievement, characteristic of Washington’s policy and of the men who withdrew under his guidance. They were kept closely to duty, as if any hour might command their utmost energies in self-defence; but their Commander-in-Chief had his own plan, as before Boston, which he did not reveal to his officers until it was ripe for execution. How well he kept his own counsel will be seen by his action. The military _ruse_ by which he achieved the result had its climax five years later, when he so adroitly persuaded Sir Henry Clinton of immediate danger to New York, that the capture of Cornwallis closed the war, and the surrender of New York followed. And as the month of August, 1776, was closing, Generals Clinton and Cornwallis were reckoning, by hours, upon the capture of Washington’s army and the restoration of British supremacy over the American continent. Early on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of August, the following private note was placed in the hands of General Heath, then commanding at Kingsbridge, by General Mifflin, the confidential messenger of the American Commander-in-Chief: LONG ISLAND, Aug. 29, 1776. DEAR GENERAL: We have many battalions from New Jersey which are coming over to relieve others here. You will therefore please to order every flat-bottomed boat and other craft at your post, fit for transporting troops, down to New York, as soon as possible. They must be manned by some of Colonel Hutchinson’s men, and sent without the least delay. I write by order of the General. MIFFLIN. TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.