Another link in the chain of proof of Britain's guilt, is found in the documents seized by the Germans in Brussels. The enemy seems to attach great importance to them, for they are being employed in much the same way that parliamentary candidates use pamphlets during an election. Yet they do not contain a particle of proof that Britain had hostile intentions against Germany, but only confirm the presence of the German menace. The documents[198] in question are reports sent by the Belgian Legation Secretaries in London, Paris and Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels. These gentlemen held opinions identical with those expressed again and again in German newspapers, and even in some British and French organs. Messieurs Comte de Lalaing (London), Greindl (Berlin), Leghait (Paris), evidently believed that the activities of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente endangered the peace of Europe. [Footnote 198: Published by the Berlin Government as supplements to the _Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, July 29th and 31st; August 4th, 8th and 12th, 1915.] Further they believed the latter constellation to be the more aggressive of the two, and formally reported these convictions to the Belgian Government. If read as a modern edition of "Pepys' Diary" they form entertaining literature, but by no stretch of the imagination could they be classed as historical sources. A gentleman who reports to his Government that King Edward took breakfast in company with M. Delcassé and that the Press had neglected to chronicle the incident, can hardly rank as an historian. Moreover, it is by no means clear why the German Press should laud M. Greindl as a gentleman of German origin. If this be true it would probably explain everything which deserves explanation in the said documents, and would probably account for the intimate, confidential treatment which M. Greindl received at the hands of German officials. German newspapers are gloating over the fact that the British Government has not deigned to reply to these "revelations." There is really nothing to which it can reply; three observers expressed their opinion on contemporaneous happenings during the years 1905-1911. But a brutal sequence of events in 1914 showed them--if they had not been convinced during the preceding three years--that they had drawn false conclusions from their observations. To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies German participation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that Germany was aware of its contents. Germany merely left Austria a free hand in the matter. Oncken endeavours to show that Austria's demands were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers found them exorbitant. He does not mention the fact that a large section of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.