My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. 236 My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic morality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions. 237 Conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was _not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing. 242 _By what means does a virtue attain to power?_--With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of acts of general "immorality."_ 252 Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc. 253 The qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us. 255 I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_ from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally _forbidden:_ virtue as I understand it is the actual _vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtu_--free from all moralic acid. 258 Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely. 261