Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 20th century; Great Britain -- Social conditions; World War, 1914-1918
Many of those who meditate on the war from its climax in 1916
to its end in the Versailles conference may wonder whether they
did wisely in execrating and howling down any one who shewed the
courage to advocate peace before the sphere of war underwent its
last desperate expansion. The government stood by its policy of a
"knock-out blow"; the knock-out blow has been dealt. Is any one the
better for it? The fire-eaters who proclaimed that anything less
than the unconditional surrender of Germany would entail another
German war within a generation now proclaim with no more doubt or
qualification that Germany is preparing her revenge and has already
recovered more quickly than any other of the belligerents.[34]
The added two years of war, then, have not brought such security
as Rome enjoyed after the destruction of Carthage; the added
bitterness of those two years, on the other hand, has made more
difficult any good-will and any common effort to substitute a saner
and better system of international relationship.
Worst of all are the world-wide economic depression and political
unrest for which the protraction of the war was responsible. Had
negotiations been opened in 1916, the Russian revolution and its
consequences might well have been averted; Germany, Austria and
Turkey might have been left with stable governments and yet with
enough experience of modern warfare to discourage any taste for
further adventures; and Italy, France and Great Britain--in that
order--might have been saved from insolvency. The war, if ended at
that time, would have been ended without American help; and peace
would have been concluded without American intervention. This last
result might by now be a matter for regret if thereby the world
had been cheated of an equitable and permanent peace, such as
President Wilson sought to impose on the militarist party of the
Versailles conference; but it would perhaps have been better for
the terms to be drawn by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George on
Carthaginian lines than for the world to be tantalised by a glimpse
of statesmanship that revealed the universal spirit and then to be
fobbed off with a compromise which embraced even the good faith of
England.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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