Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 20th century; Great Britain -- Social conditions; World War, 1914-1918
This, as will be seen later, is not to hold the German government
solely responsible for the war nor to admit that war was
inevitable. The ancestral voices of the Chauvinists who in 1914
took most credit for their prescience in prophesying war might have
been stilled by the reflection that from the Fashoda incident to
the Lansdowne _entente_ they had predicted a no less inevitable
war with France, as, a generation earlier, they had predicted one
with Russia; the good-will, moreover, which Great Britain for
half-a-dozen years before the war extended to Russia and France had
its exact counterpart in the former good-will which obtained when
Lord Salisbury presented Heligoland to Germany and when, earlier,
English sympathy was on the side of Prussia in the war of 1870.
No war is inevitable until it breaks out, if then; and successful
diplomacy in effect and in intention is the history of inevitable
wars which have never taken place.
By 1914, as indeed in 1911, the blundering of four Foreign Offices
had produced a state of tension in which war was very difficult
to avoid; but the phrase-fed population which repeated in solemn
tones that Germany had "been preparing for this war for forty
years" seemed never to enquire why the war had not been fought by
instalments (as, all were told, Germany would assuredly do if Great
Britain did not play her part in 1914) and why the first attack had
not been launched in 1905 when Russia was exhausted by her struggle
with Japan in Manchuria and distracted at home by revolution and
experiments in constitution-making. So she might have rid herself
for many years of the Russian menace; and, if France had been drawn
in, it is inconceivable that so early as 1906 Great Britain would
have been drawn in too. The reconstruction of the Kiel Canal was
therefore unimportant; and, for an occasion of war, nothing less
flimsy than the assassination of an archduke was ever necessary.
And archdukes were plentiful. That Germany did not provoke a
conflict in 1905 suggests that she had not in fact devoted forty
years to preparing for a world-war and, further, that in that
year she did not regard a war of any kind as inevitable. By 1914
her view of world-politics had swung round; and, if other nations
contributed to bring war nearer, Germany must bear full and sole
responsibility for provoking it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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