White House gossip : $b from Andrew Johnson to Calvin CoolidgeColman, Edna M. (Edna Mary)
History
White House gossip : $b from Andrew Johnson to Calvin Coolidge
Colman, Edna M. (Edna Mary)
Presidents -- United States -- Biography; Washington (D.C.) -- Social life and customs; White House (Washington, D.C.)
“He should have endeavoured on May 23, at Cienfuegos, to obtain
information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the
insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him
at 8:15 A. M. of that date.
“He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with
all dispatch and should have disposed his vessels with a view to
intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron.
“He should not have delayed the squadron for the _Eagle_.
“He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his
squadron.
“He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department’s order of May 25.
“He should have endeavoured to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels
at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbour on May 29 and 30.
“He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture
or destroy the _Colón_ and other vessels of the enemy which he
attacked on May 31.
“By commencing the engagement on July 3 with the port battery and
turning the _Brooklyn_ around with port helm Commodore Schley caused
her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially
with the _Vizcaya_ and _Colón_.
“The turn of the _Brooklyn_ to starboard was made to avoid getting her
into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made
toward the _Texas_ and caused that vessel to stop and to back her
engines to avoid possible collision.
“Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieut. Commander A. C. Hodgson in
publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between
them.
“Commodore Schley’s conduct in connection with the events of the
Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by
vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise.
“His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling
facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading.
“His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed, and he
encouraged in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to
fight courageously.
“GEORGE DEWEY,
_Admiral, U. S. N., President_.
“SAM. C. LEMLY,
_Judge-Advocate-General, U. S. N., Judge-Advocate_.
“In the opinion of the undersigned, the passage from Key West to
Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible dispatch,
Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off
Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships’ bunkers.
“The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective.
“Commodore Schley in permitting the steamer _Adula_ to enter the port
of Cienfuegos expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish
Squadron from her when she came out.
“The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about 22 miles south of
Santiago was made with as much dispatch as was possible while keeping
the squadron a unit.
“The blockade of Santiago was effective.
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