Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
History
Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised)
University of Oxford. Faculty of Modern History
World War, 1914-1918
We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference
idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in
which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian
reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further
negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full
appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities
having already been opened.
In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised
Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the
monarchy.
Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military
preparations of Russia and France.
[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]
On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in
Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time
further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military
preparations of France, both on water and on land.
On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an
interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he
reported by telegraph, as follows:
"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government
to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce
Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the
sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the
conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided
upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas
appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia
now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same
which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia,
i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised
to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial
aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in
war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with
Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return
to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian
affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European
conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the
magnitude of this danger.
"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia
could not now be deserted by Russia".
On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the
following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff
of the Russian army:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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