attitude of countries to each other, and remain firmly convinced that to-day, as yesterday and the day before, great nations are moved by an irresistible desire to add to their territories and in every way aggrandize themselves, by diplomacy if possible, and if diplomacy fails, by force. It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty what the real designs of the Emperor and his Government in this regard were during the Morocco episode, or are now. Some believe that their designs have always aimed, and still aim, at depriving Great Britain of her position of superiority in respect of territory, maritime dominion, and trade. Others hold that they seek and will have, _coûte que coûte_, new territory for Germany's increasing population, and look with greedy eyes towards South America and even Holland. Others yet again represent them as incessantly on the watch to seize a harbour here or there as a coaling station for warships and a basis of attack. But an unbiased survey of the annals of the Emperor's reign hitherto does not bear out any of these assertions. A policy of territorial expansion as such, mere earth-hunger, cannot be proved against him. Prince Bismarck was no colonial enthusiast, though he passes for being the founder of Germany's present colonial policy; and even to-day the colonial party in Germany, though a very noisy, is not a very large or influential one. Samoa--East Africa--Kiao-tschau--the Carolines--Heligoland--the Cameroons: how can the acquisition of comparatively insignificant and unprofitable places like these be used for proving that the might of Germany is or has been directed towards territorial conquest? What, it may however be asked, of the Morocco adventure? Of the speech at Tangier? Of the sending of the _Panther_ to Agadir? Of the demand for compensation in Central Africa? Until the Morocco question arose, all the quarrels amongst the Powers regarding territory were caused by the territorial ambition of France, or Russia, or Italy--not of Germany; and it was not until France showed openly, by sending her troops to Fez, and thus ignoring the Act of Algeciras, that Germany put forward claims for territorial compensation in connection with Morocco. The visit of the Emperor to Tangier in 1905, a year after the Anglo-French Agreement, was doubtless an unpleasant surprise for both England and France. And not without good cause; for England and France are naturally and historically Mediterranean Powers--the one as guardian of the route to her Eastern possessions, the other as the owners of a large extent of Mediterranean coast; while England, in addition, was justified in seeing with uneasiness the possibility of a German settlement at Tangier or elsewhere on the Morocco seaboard. But the Tangier visit and all that followed it was the consequence, not of an adventurous policy of territorial conquest, but of a legitimate, and not wholly selfish, desire for economic expansion.