William Pitt and the Great WarRose, J. Holland (John Holland)
History
William Pitt and the Great War
Rose, J. Holland (John Holland)
Europe -- History -- 1789-1815; Great Britain -- History -- George III, 1760-1820; Pitt, William, 1759-1806
In this respect Pitt showed less of worldly wisdom than the journalists
and barristers who leaped to power at Paris. Their chief source of
strength lay in skilful appeals to popular passion. In reality their
case was untenable before any calm and judicial tribunal. But the France
of that age was anything but calm and judicial. It lived on enthusiasm
and sensation; and the Girondins and Jacobins fed it almost to
repletion. Unfortunately Danton, the only man who combined strength with
some insight into statecraft, was away in Belgium while the crisis
developed; and the conduct of affairs rested mainly with Lebrun and his
envoy Chauvelin. It is only fair to remember that they were thirty and
twenty-seven years of age respectively, and had had just four months and
eight months of official experience. In such a case pity must blend with
censure. The frightful loss of experienced men and the giddy preference
for new-comers were among the most fatal characteristics of the
revolutionary movement. Needing natures that were able, yet
self-restrained, bold, but cautiously bold, it now found as leaders
calculating fanatics like Robespierre, headstrong orators and
wire-pullers like the Girondin leaders, or lucky journalists like
Lebrun. To play to the gallery was his first instinct; and the tottering
fortunes of the Gironde made it almost a necessity. Hence his refusal
and that of his colleagues to draw back a hair's breadth from the
unjustifiable position which they had taken up. Behind them loomed the
September massacres, fatal to two Foreign Ministers of France; before
them shone the splendours of a liberating crusade. We can scarcely blame
men so ardent, so hard pressed.
But there are some rules of the game which even the most irresponsible
of Ministers must observe. Here both Chauvelin and Lebrun went fatally
astray. Chauvelin's _pique_ at the interview which Pitt had with Maret
on 2nd December led him flagrantly to misrepresent that incident, and
Lebrun, as we have seen, reported it to the Convention in such a way as
to impute to Pitt a discreditable and cowardly intrigue. This is the
climax of malice. An envoy and a Minister who scatter such insinuations
are the most reckless of firebrands. By this conduct both Lebrun and
Chauvelin inflamed the passions of their countrymen. In truth, it was
passion, not policy, that made the war. The charges which they brought
against England were of secondary importance--her demand for the
revocation of the decrees concerning the Scheldt and the encouragement
offered to malcontents, together with her stoppage of corn ships lading
for France, and her Aliens Bill. Such were the pretexts for the recall
of Chauvelin, which, as we have seen, was decided at Paris before the
Court of St. James's determined to dismiss him.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account