William Pitt and the Great WarRose, J. Holland (John Holland)
History
William Pitt and the Great War
Rose, J. Holland (John Holland)
Europe -- History -- 1789-1815; Great Britain -- History -- George III, 1760-1820; Pitt, William, 1759-1806
The main object of His Majesty is the keeping together by
influence and weight this great Confederation by which alone the
designs of France can be resisted, and which, if left to itself,
would be too likely to fall to pieces from the jarring interests
of the Powers engaged in it.--GRENVILLE TO MALMESBURY, _21st
April 1794_.
The disgraceful failure of every military operation His Prussian
Majesty has undertaken since the year 1791 has destroyed the
reputation of the Prussian army; and the duplicity and
versatility of his Cabinet put an end to all confidence and good
faith.--MALMESBURY TO GRENVILLE, _20th September 1794_.
As in parliamentary life, so too in the wider spheres of diplomacy and
warfare, a Coalition very rarely holds together under a succession of
sharp blows. This is inherent in the nature of things. A complex or
heterogeneous substance is easily split up by strokes which leave a
homogeneous body intact. Rocks of volcanic origin defy the hammer under
which conglomerates crumble away; and when these last are hurled against
granite or flint, they splinter at once. Well might Shakespeare speak
through the mouth of Ulysses these wise words on the divisions of the
Greeks before Troy:
Look how many Grecian tents do stand
Hollow upon this plain, so many hollow factions.
...
Troy in our weakness stands, not in her strength.[335]
Pitt and his colleagues were under no illusion as to the weakness of the
first Coalition against France. They well knew the incurable jealousies
of the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, the utter weakness of the
Holy Roman Empire, the poverty or torpor of Spain, Sardinia, and
Naples, the potent distractions produced by the recent partition of
Poland, and the Machiavellian scheme of the Empress Catharine II to busy
the Central Powers in French affairs so that she might have a free hand
at Warsaw. All this and much more stood revealed to them. But they
grounded their hopes of success on two important considerations; first,
that the finances of France were exhausted; secondly, that the rule of
the Jacobins, fertile in forced loans, forced service, and guillotining,
must speedily collapse. On the subject of French finance there are many
notes in the Pitt Papers, which show that Pitt believed an utter
breakdown to be imminent. Grenville, too, at the close of October 1793,
stated that France had lost at least 200,000 soldiers, while more than
50,000 were in hospital. The repugnance to military service was
universal, and the deficit for the month of August alone was close on
L17,000,000.[336]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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