There was yet further bad news to come, for, four days after Magersfontein, Buller was defeated in his attempt to force the Boer lines, guns were lost, and there was a heavy death-roll. It was no consolation to the men who had fought at Magersfontein to know that they were not alone in misfortune, and that similar reverses had been encountered in Natal and Cape Colony. The question that each asked the other was, what would they say in England? Would the same craven policy that had prevailed after Majuba be adopted, and another surrender be made to the Boers? or would the nation show the energy that had in old times been evinced when danger was greatest, and rise to the occasion? Even in that case, many weeks must elapse before sufficient reinforcements could arrive from England to enable them to take the offensive again; for that another advance against the Boer position was impossible even the most sanguine had to admit. The whole force were now gathered on the Modder, and they had no fear that the Boers would be able to drive them from it. But this was but a poor consolation. All were burning to retrieve the last defeat, and it was gall and wormwood to know that they would be forced to remain inactive. In the camp of the Scottish regiments the feeling was bitter in the extreme. Now that the long agony of the conflict, which had broken down the nerve of the strongest, was over, they felt that they had to some extent tarnished the reputation of regiments which had hitherto been without a blemish, and the blame was thrown by them, not on the general whom they so loved, but upon Lord Methuen. The imputation was an unfounded one. The task before Lord Methuen was one of enormous difficulty. The point he had selected for attack was the best that could have been chosen. The only fault committed by him was, that he did not risk the lives of a few mounted men, by sending small parties out to reconnoitre the veldt to the foot of the kopjes, in order to discover the exact position of the Boer trenches.