American diplomacy in Russia had received its first great shock, but with careful handling it was still possible to recover the lost ground. With the utter failure of the "Isle of Dogs" policy, Russian rage quickly subsided and a normal condition soon returned. The Allies had received a salutary warning, and most of them took the hint, but America continued on her debatable course. Having failed diplomatically to effect a compromise, she tried to force her views by military means. The neutral zone system of her commanders was the natural outcome of President Wilson's proposal. The intention was excellent, that the results would be disastrous was never in doubt. It forced the American command to adopt a sort of local recognition of the Red Army within the zone, and enabled the Japanese to appear as the sole friend of Russian order. The Japanese were attacked by Red forces collected in these zones, with American soldiers standing as idle spectators of some of the most desperate affairs between Red and Allied troops. Japan was entitled to reap the kudos such a situation brought to her side, while America could not expect to escape the severest censure. Profiting by the blunders of her great antagonist, Japan managed in six months to recover all the ground she had lost while suffering under the illusion of a great Hun victory that was to give her the Lordship of the East. From a blustering bandit she has become a humble helper of her poor, sick, Russian neighbour. In which role she is most dangerous time will show. The world as a rule has little faith in sudden conversions. This, then, was the situation in the Far East in June, 1919. As I was leaving Vladivostok I heard that the Red forces that had been organised in the American neutral zones had at last boldly attacked their protectors. If this was correct, it may be the reason why Admiral Koltchak was able to report their defeat and rout over the Chinese border and we were back again at the point at which British and Czech co-operation had arrived a year previously. CHAPTER XXIV GENERAL CONCLUSIONS Before we decide our policy as to withdrawal or otherwise from Russia it is necessary to know whether we have contracted any obligations to the Russian people, and what is the nature of such obligations, if any. Are they moral, military, or political?