So the column encamped with orders to march at dawn and breakfast on the Modder. Lord Methuen, his staff, even the British scouts, had been deceived by rumours artfully spread to the effect that the enemy would make no stand before Spytfontein, some miles beyond the Modder River. A reconnaissance on the 27th revealed no sign of the enemy. "There was," says Mr. Kinnear, "an absurd contempt for the enemy on the part of the Headquarters Staff, and an indifference most pronounced as to his whereabouts and strength. At Graspan Lord Methuen expected a brush with 800 Boers. He encountered over 3,000 of the enemy. But this taught no lesson, until we became almost like the courtiers of King Louis, who neither learned anything nor forgot anything." Yet, in justice to a much-criticised general, it should be remembered that Lord Methuen on the afternoon of the 27th personally examined Modder River bridge, and rode within 300 yards of what afterwards proved to be the Boer position. The enemy did not stir or move; no shots were fired; and no sign whatever of the presence of 8,000 or 9,000 men could be detected. [Sidenote: Lord Methuen's available forces.] At Klokfontein Lord Methuen was reinforced by a fine Highland battalion, the 1st Argyll and Sutherlands. Deducting all losses he had now 8,000 infantry, 400 cavalry and mounted infantry, and 300 artillery with twelve guns. At Belmont, in his rear was the 62nd Field Battery with six more guns. It will be seen that the column still remained pitifully weak in two essential components of an army--cavalry and artillery. [Illustration: [_Stereo-Photo by Underwood & Underwood. Copyright 1900._ THE DRUMMER BOY'S LETTER HOME. The drum-head makes a very fair writing table.] [Sidenote: [NOV. 28, 1899.] [Sidenote: The Boers in force at the Modder River.]