The conduct of the day's fighting provoked some bitter, perhaps intemperate, complaints of the British generals' tactics. It was said of one of the Brigade Commanders that "he took personal command of the York and Lancaster and the South Lancashire regiments, and ordered a futile bayonet charge at an enemy nearly fifteen hundred yards away. This attracted such heavy fire that the two regiments sought shelter and declined to follow their officers another yard." [Illustration: [_Photo by Chas. Knight._ MAJOR-GENERAL HART. Major-General A. FitzRoy Hart, C.B., commanding the 5th Brigade of the 10th Division.] [Sidenote: JAN. 20-21, 1900.] _Ineffectiveness of the British Guns._] [Sidenote: Lyttelton's advance.] On the afternoon of the 20th, to support Sir Charles Warren's attack, General Lyttelton advanced directly upon the Boer trenches which lined the eastern slope of Spion Kop and the southern slope of Brakfontein. This was a totally distinct movement from Sir Charles Warren's, and was directed from Potgieter's Drift. The howitzers and naval guns aided the infantry with their fire. At the same time Bethune's Mounted Infantry were ordered to move along the river to the east; they speedily came into contact with the enemy in strong force, and as their orders were to do nothing more than demonstrate, retired. But the presence of the enemy in strength in this quarter, close to Skiet's Drift, seriously menaced the British line of communications. Meantime, General Lyttelton pushed up to within 1500 yards of the main Boer entrenchments, and after long-range firing slowly fell back, with two killed and fifteen wounded or missing. [Illustration: [_Photo by Barnett._ RUSSIAN DOCTORS WITH THE BOER ARMY PICKING UP BRITISH SHELLS.] [Illustration: INDIAN AMBULANCE CART WITH BULLER'S ARMY.] [Sidenote: Warren telegraphs for howitzers.] [Sidenote: [JAN. 21, 1900.]