The morning of this day a fresh council of war was held, though councils of war have ever been considered the refuge of the irresolute. General Buller--Commander-in-Chief of the Natal army--"pointed out" that for four days Sir Charles Warren "had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill; that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations," and that "it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged." But the Commander-in-Chief gave no orders; he only told his subordinate either to attack or withdraw, and shrank from the responsibility of making the decision himself. To use his own phrase, he still "advocated" a turning movement by the left. But finally he assented to the storming of Spion Kop--it was the second time this question had been debated--though he thought General Woodgate better suited for the work, inasmuch as General Coke was still lame from a broken leg. [Illustration: [_Photo by the Absent Minded Beggar Corps._ THE 2nd LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS EMBARKING AT SOUTHAMPTON, December 2, 1899. This battalion greatly distinguished itself under General Woodgate in the "week of battles" leading up to the attack on Spion Kop, and furnished the largest contingent for that bloody battle.] [Sidenote: Warren reinforced.] [Sidenote: JAN. 23, 1900.] _The British Silently Ascend Spion Kop._] Throughout this day the troops were exposed to a heavy shell fire, which, without causing many casualties, was yet exceedingly galling, and it grew hourly clearer and clearer that there were no other alternatives but General Buller's "withdraw or assault." Steps were taken to prepare for the attack on Spion Kop. Careful reconnaissances were made, and the Imperial Light Infantry and other reinforcements were added to Sir Charles Warren's command. From Chieveley, where General Barton's Brigade had exchanged long-range fire with the Boers on the 19th and 23rd, two battalions were withdrawn and added to General Lyttelton's Brigade. In this direction nothing of importance had happened. On the 19th a picket of South African Light Horse, while scouting along the Tugela to the west of Colenso, had been ambushed by the Boers and six men captured; on the 23rd a patrol near Hlangwane had been surprised, but was able to make its escape. It was clear, however, that the enemy were in no great strength at Colenso, so that the two battalions left at Chieveley were ample to hold the rail-head. It is now known that General Joubert expected the main attack at Potgieter's Drift, and had concentrated most of his men opposite this point, leaving his left at Colenso and his right beyond Spion Kop, towards Acton Homes, excessively weak. On the Spion Kop side, according to Boer accounts, General Botha had but 2,000 men. The Boers persistently