The causes of the defeat were many. In the first place must be set a faulty military system. The Boers, observes Mr. Churchill, would have placed 300 men on Spion Kop, who, by taking cover and shooting carefully among the rocks, would have suffered but little from the artillery fire. The British generals massed first 2,000, and then 5,000 men upon the height--a target for every shell. The failure to construct serviceable entrenchments has already been noticed, and in some degree explained, but it is possible that if the British infantry had been regularly trained to the use of the spade, the difficulties would have been overcome. The fog was an element by no means favourable to our success; it prevented the troops from seeing where to advance, and gave the enemy time to rally and collect. The breakdown of all organisation and organising power at the close of a day of desperate and prolonged conflict is not altogether to be wondered at. "If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hill would have been held, I am sure," wrote General Buller. "As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion." In his despatch, covering and commenting upon the various reports, Lord Roberts gave the final and well-balanced judgment of a great soldier. He held that General Buller's original plan for a turning movement had been well conceived and had every probability of success if only it had been executed. He blamed, for the failure upon Spion Kop, General Buller, because of his "disinclination to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done"; Sir C. Warren, because of his "errors of judgment" and "want of administrative capacity," and because he had not himself visited the summit in the hours of crisis; and Colonel Thorneycroft, because of his "unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility." But the nation will not forget that while the gravest mistakes were made, they were made by generals who were brave, patriotic Englishmen, under the stress and anxiety of conflict. It is painful to have to record the fact that the man who was probably least to blame was the one singled out for punishment. Colonel Crofton was retired from his command, because of the brief message he had signalled to headquarters announcing the dangerous position on Spion Kop. Some months later, after the publication of the despatches, Sir C. Warren was recalled from Natal and given an administrative post in Griqualand West. [Illustration: AN AMBULANCE WAGGON STUCK FAST ON A BROKEN BRIDGE NEAR POTGIETER'S DRIFT.] [Illustration: NAVAL 6-INCH GUN ON ITS SPECIALLY-DESIGNED TRUCK.] CHAPTER XIV. VAAL KRANTZ.