[Illustration: VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE-MEN BRINGING THE WOUNDED ACROSS THE RIVER BY MEANS OF THE PONT OR RAFT.] [Sidenote: Council of War.] Unless a resolute advance was made, Vaal Krantz was an utterly useless possession. It was exposed to fire from three sides; it was not a good artillery position; it had little natural strength; and it was now ascertained to be very far from being the "key to Ladysmith." The original intention, to follow up its seizure by a flank attack upon Brakfontein, had to be abandoned, because troops massing for such an attack would have been exposed to a devastating artillery fire from Doorn Kloof. The same consideration compelled the withholding of the cavalry who were to have menaced the Boer rear. Nothing remained, if the advance was to be pressed, but to storm the ridge which rose behind Vaal Krantz, and to assault and capture at the same time the lofty eminence of Doorn Kloof. A council of war was held to determine the course which should be taken. General Hart alone--"No-Bobs" as his soldiers called him, from the fact that he never bent his head before the storm of bullets--was for such an assault, which, it was allowed, must cost the lives or limbs of thousands of men. He was for going forward at all risks, and for storming Doorn Kloof. But the other officers were against so bold, so desperate, a course. They were for withdrawing and trying yet another line of approach to Ladysmith. To this General Buller was himself inclined, in view of the frightful difficulties of the country before him. Accordingly, a general retreat was once more ordered; General Hildyard's Brigade was to evacuate Vaal Krantz that night--the night of the 7th--and, with the rest of the army, to fall back to Springfield and Chieveley. [Sidenote: Evacuation of the ridge.] [Sidenote: FEB. 5-7, 1900.] _The "Key to Ladysmith" lost._] [Sidenote: Losses.]