That night the defeated general telegraphed to the Home Government a brief and manly account of the unlucky day. He neither minimised nor exaggerated the disaster. He has been censured for opening his melancholy dispatch with the words, "I regret to report serious reverse;" but if this was not a "serious reverse" speech has no meaning. It was a matter of absolute necessity to give the authorities at home true and exact information as to the situation, that they might be able to gauge correctly the measures necessary to meet the danger. Not General Buller for making this report, but the home authorities, for publishing it, must be blamed, if there is to be any blame. [Sidenote: Armistice.] Thus checked, the General next day obtained an armistice for the purpose of burying the dead and recovering any of the wounded who might have escaped notice. The dead were found to have been stripped of their clothes by the Boers, who were short of clothing themselves, though the wounded near the enemy's lines on the previous day had been very kindly treated and given water. They were deprived of their arms and accoutrements, but were allowed by the enemy to be carried off by our stretcher-bearers and ambulances, only the slightly wounded officers being detained as prisoners. [Illustration: THIRSTY SOLDIERS TAKING THEIR TURN AT THE WATER-BARREL. The scarcity of water is one of the great obstacles to the rapid movement of troops in South Africa.] [Sidenote: A day of blunders.] [Sidenote: [DEC. 15, 1899.] The enemy throughout fought with great courage and determination, but it must be remembered that they had the advantage of strong entrenchments. They displayed particular restraint and coolness in sitting quiet under a tremendous bombardment, and in allowing General Buller's men to advance to relatively close quarters before fire was opened. What is wonderful is that the British Intelligence Department in the field seems to have known very little of the enemy's disposition and entrenchments. The day was a day of tragic blunders issuing in great and unnecessary sacrifice of men. That the loss was not far heavier is surprising in view of the intensity and volume of the enemy's fire. The casualty list at least proved that the Boers were not the marksmen they had been supposed to be. [Illustration: COLONEL C. J. LONG, R.A. Obtained his Lieutenancy in 1870; served in the Afghan War of 1878-80, and in the Soudan under Lord Kitchener in 1897-8 as commandant of the Egyptian artillery. He was present at the battle of Khartoum, and for his services on that occasion was mentioned in despatches. Colonel, September, 1899; in command of the Royal Artillery at Colenso, where his anxiety to get within effective range of the enemy led to the loss of ten guns. In that action he was severely wounded.] [Illustration: IN A BOER LAAGER: COOKS PREPARING A MEAL.] [Sidenote: Why the attack failed.] [Sidenote: DEC. 15, 1899.] _Causes which Led to our Defeat._]