The reply to my letter stated that the condition of the Indian Corps was well known, and I was to exercise caution in its employment, and that the Commander-in-Chief would give such assistance as was possible, and this was outlined; but I was given no hope of a rest for the Corps as a whole, except such as I could eke out after the reinforcements arrived. I realised the immense difficulties of the Commander-in-Chief; but I am now writing for those who, knowing nothing of our own difficulties, passed hasty judgement and unfairly criticised men who were in truth doing right good work. As a matter of fact no rest was given, but the Indian Corps held on to its line for twenty-four days longer, reducing daily and being eventually altogether too weak for its task. As if, however, to strain the rope to the last strand, after the reinforcements arrived, instead of deriving any benefit I was ordered to farther extend my front to include Givenchy and up to the La Bassée-Bethune road. I knew how fatal was such an order, but there was nothing to do but obey. The French Brigadier whom we relieved was surprised at the smallness of the numbers of the relieving troops, and told us his own outgoing strength, which was very considerably higher. Shortly after that a heavy German attack was launched at us, straining the tired-out troops to the limit of endurance and entailing, after three days’ hard fighting, the assistance of the First Army Corps from reserve to restore the position. All that will be described in due course; but why I have gone into detail regarding this matter is that, notwithstanding my having so strongly urged a rest, and written as plainly as a Corps Commander could well do in the field, yet in the despatch describing the operations of the 18th and 19th December I am alluded to as having made an attack on the Germans, because I deemed it to be “a favourable opportunity.” Nothing could be farther from the facts. I considered it in truth a most unfavourable opportunity; but my instructions as they read to me, and which I will quote fully, were sufficiently clear to lay on me the definite duty of using every endeavour to make one or more local pushes to the front if I considered this reasonably feasible, and under those conditions I chose what appeared to me to be the most favourable opportunity that presented itself. I had once drawn attention to the long term of unrelieved duty in the trenches, and again when my front was extended beyond the power of the tired Corps to hold on, and I could do no more. On 28th November I had the honour of entertaining General de Maud’huy, Commanding Xth French Army, at lunch. He and his Staff stayed till late in the afternoon, and as usual I never enjoyed anything in France better than visits to or from our Allied officers.