Times gradually changed, until the British Army was equipped as no army ever was before or probably will be again, but the improvements were gradual, the Staff work enlarged with the experience gained, time was given officers and men to go into the battle-line after a thorough training in the requirements of trench or open warfare, and everything improved until there was little room for improvement left. In the Neuve Chapelle days, with all our shortage of shells, grenades, etc., there was no shortage of endeavour, and in that respect indeed there was even more need to husband our resources and make the best use of them. Even so, and considering that we had been at war for seven months, it reads strangely in the official reports of the Indian Corps that in the case of two Territorial battalions attached to our brigades, and both of whom fought splendidly, “Owing to the —— and —— battalions having only just arrived, and not being in possession of any telephone equipment or trained signallers, communication during the battle had to be carried on by messengers alone.” Yes, times indeed changed, but there never was any difference in the fighting spirit of the officers and men; they remained as they were from Mons to the Marne, from Ypres to La Bassée; the same immortal souls, if anything, even braver, in the hour of sore trial, outnumbered and outgunned, than in the later days of triumph when the Huns at last began to realise that This England never did, nor never shall, Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror. The object of the operations, as laid down in the First Army operation orders, was “to force the enemy’s lines in the vicinity of Neuve Chapelle, and drive back any hostile forces from the line Aubers-Ligny-le-Grand, with the object of cutting off the enemy’s troops which are now holding the front between Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée.” The orders of the First Army were always clear and distinct, and I never experienced any difficulty in thoroughly recognising their object. It was sometimes the execution, with the very limited number of guns and ammunition, that was the difficulty. At Neuve Chapelle, however, we were locally and temporarily superior in both guns and men, and had we succeeded in gaining more than our first objective we could have advanced our line to the Aubers Ridge. Suppose we had done this, the question arises, was it possible to retain the advantage? Judging from what immediately followed the battle we certainly could not have done so.