India. Army; World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- Western Front; World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- India
The frontage attacked was 600 yards, the obstacles being _chevaux de
frise_, thickly wired, generally in one but sometimes in two rows, and a
certain amount of low wire entanglement. The depth of the obstacles
varied from 6 to 15 yards, but owing to their being opposite one side of
a salient only a limited number of batteries could be brought into
action, so that the line of fire was direct. The 9th and 13th Brigades
took position at ranges averaging 1800 yards. The 4th Brigade was
disposed at an average range of 2500 yards, the line of fire being
oblique.
The method of attack was that in each battery of the 9th and 13th
Brigades fire was concentrated on numbers 2 and 5 guns, whereby two
lanes per battery, or twelve in all, were to be formed.
The 4th Brigade concentrated three guns on each alternate lane position.
The allowance of ammunition was 50 rounds per gun, and was fired in ten
minutes.
Thus twelve lanes were formed, six by having 150 rounds and six by
having 300 rounds expended on them.
The Garhwal Brigade, which had the honour of being detailed to carry out
the first assault, was commanded by a fine soldier, Brigadier-General
Blackader. I had first met him when he commanded his battalion of
Leicesters in India, and from that day onwards I had learned to respect
him and to trust in his judgement. The manner in which he handled his
Brigade at Neuve Chapelle was good to see, and his report on the three
days’ fighting is concise, and written as brave and modest men write.
In support of the Garhwal was the Dehra Dun Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier-General Jacob.
The Bareilly Brigade continued to hold the original trenches, and in
command of it was Brigadier-General Southey, Indian Army, in whom I
reposed the utmost confidence.
Whatever the qualifications of other brigade commanders in France, I
certainly was fortunate in those who directed their brigades at Neuve
Chapelle.
And all is now ready for the great attack. In such moments men think and
act according to their own peculiar natures; the Oriental’s thoughts are
generally quite different from our own. I asked a sepoy I had known for
years, and who came out of the battle scatheless, how he felt just
before the assault. This was his reply: “My right-hand comrade had been
looking at a rough map with the names of the villages and trenches
marked in Hindustani. I could read the names, but did not understand the
map; so just before we started I made up my mind to go to my British
officer after the battle and get him to teach me. I had no time to think
of anything else, for just then we advanced.” Splendid fellow! I am glad
I was not the first German who came across his path; but his simple
story impressed me much. He was not wondering what was going to happen;
he was just going to death, if Ishwar so ordained, and if he lived he
was going to improve his military value.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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