To resume my story. At 4.40 P.M. on the 12th March General Strickland was informed by Walker that there would be another artillery bombardment from 5 to 5.15 P.M., at which hour the infantry would again attack. During this period the O.C. 47th Sikhs reported that his unit then consisted of but five British and seven Indian officers, and about 130 men “as far as he could ascertain”; whilst the Manchesters reported the battalion as “very much reduced.” By 5.45 P.M. on the 12th it was rumoured that the Sirhind Brigade had reached the Layes river, and it was enjoined on all units that the attack should be carried out “vigorously,” as the British Brigade on our left was to assault at the same hour. For various reasons the bombardment did not take place, in fact, till later, and at 6.5 P.M. the Jalandar and Sirhind Brigades made their attempt to advance. Meantime, General Keary, commanding the Lahore Division, had taken over all the troops of his Division, and issued orders for the capture of the Bois du Biez “at all costs.” Still no advance was made on our left, and after covering a very short distance the forward rush was again stayed by the deadly oblique and machine-gun fire from the German trenches. Casualties were accumulating, and the wearied troops were getting done up after their trials of two whole days without rest. However, I received fresh orders at 7.20 P.M. for an attack by the whole of the Lahore Division. Without going into details which would interest no one, these orders were found to be impracticable during the hours of darkness, over unknown ground, and I most reluctantly felt obliged to hold them in abeyance. I feel sure the G.O.C. First Army when he found what the situation really was, agreed with my decision. At 10 P.M. orders were received to suspend further forward operations and to consolidate our gains. The Jalandar Brigade was withdrawn to the Rue de Berceaux, where it had already once moved back the previous day. The battle was fought and won. We had not done all that was hoped for; we had not captured the Aubers Ridge (nor did we succeed in doing so until three years later), but as far as the Corps was concerned we had shown that Indians will face any enemy. How changed are some of our notions regarding the enemy, and how different became our orders as the war went on, from those which prevailed before Neuve Chapelle. I recall how, after a conference held before the battle, I left with the impression that Army Headquarters would shortly, in all probability, be advanced some miles. Places were named; the _moral_ of the Germans was placed at a low ebb; and perhaps to encourage all ranks, perhaps because the higher authorities really believed it, the general impression left on me was that the Hun was on the eve of receiving a blow so severe that it would be with difficulty he could recover. Second Ypres, Loos, the Somme, Verdun, Amiens, and other mighty battles had not then been fought.