At 10 A.M. the G.O.C. Seventh British Division reported that the Eighth Division on our left was unable to make much headway beyond the front line of German trenches owing to fortified posts in rear, which were being bombarded afresh. The Garhwal Brigade was placed in support of the Bareilly Brigade. The 9th Gurkhas, which so far had not been seriously engaged, was ordered to join the Garhwal Brigade, which was short of Lieut.-Colonel Drake-Brockman’s detachment. The relief of the Dehra Dun by the Bareilly Brigade was commenced and carried out with considerable difficulty as the communication trenches were full of dead and wounded, and the movement being observed by the enemy, a heavy shell-fire was kept up by them. Owing to the destruction of our trenches it was found impossible to carry out the fresh attack, even at the altered hour, and the First Army directed that both the Meerut and First Divisions should assault at 4 P.M. At 12 noon the G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade reported to General Anderson that in the opinion of the G.O.C. Dehra Dun Brigade (the morning attacking Brigade) the enemy’s position had been in no way weakened and that the machine-gun fire which had caused the check of all efforts of the Dehra Dun Brigade was as heavy as ever. He added that the parapets were somewhat battered by our artillery, but that this was compensated for by the German reinforcements which had since come up; that three of his battalions had been exposed to heavy shell-fire, and that he wished the above situation to be known before the assault commenced. On receipt of this report General Anderson considered it advisable to inform me, but instructed the G.O.C. Bareilly Brigade that meantime the attack would take place as ordered. Whatever the circumstances, I considered it imperative to carry out this assault, and sent instructions that it was to be pressed at all costs, and the Divisional Commander added to this that it was to be carried on into the night if necessary. The orders of the First Army were distinct, and the movements of the First Division on my right depended on ours. I therefore felt bound to do all in my power to comply with the Army orders. By 4 P.M. the 2nd Black Watch had relieved the 2/2nd Gurkhas on the right, the 41st Dogras the 1st Seaforths on the left, and the 58th Rifles had taken the place of the 1/4th Seaforths in the centre. The 1/4th Black Watch was in reserve. The 1st Seaforths, on this 9th May 1915, had, if possible, beaten all their records for dogged valour. Nothing in war could exceed the determination to win through displayed by all ranks, and where they failed no other Corps could have succeeded. When I received their casualty roll I could have wept and felt no sense of weakness: seven officers and 130 other ranks killed or missing; ten officers and 350 other ranks wounded, and mostly within a few short moments.