At 4.20 P.M., 18th May, the Sirhind Brigade reported that, owing to the heavy German Artillery fire, the bombing parties and troops intended for the attack were being held up in their original trenches, and shortly after communication with the front became very difficult owing to all wires being cut. By 5.40 P.M., 18th May, it was ascertained that the Guards Brigade were getting forward by short rushes, and the G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade was directed to use every possible endeavour to try and get his own attack forward also. At 6 P.M. he reported that the bombing parties had made three attempts to cross, but had so far failed. As the attack appeared quite unable to advance, I telephoned that if it could not attain its object by day it must do so by night, and further Artillery support was promised. As the troops of the Second Division on our right were being relieved during the night 18th-19th May, I sent instructions that no attack should be made till this relief was completed, but added that it must then be made. At 10 P.M. General Walker, V.C., in command of the Sirhind Brigade, represented that he considered the German position round the Ferme du Bois was such that the success of an attack was very doubtful, and that the probable loss of life would be great until our present position could be consolidated, and a front from which to advance was assured. While again reminding the Division that it was most desirable the attack should be made, I left it to the judgement of General Walker, an experienced officer, on the spot, to decide. At 11.10 P.M. it was definitely decided that the attack should not be made. Throughout the night the Sirhind Brigade was in close touch with the Germans to its front. The 15th Sikhs had been undergoing many vicissitudes during all the confused fighting of the past days, and as already related they had given a fine example of the stuff of which the Khalsa is made. Attached to the battalion was Captain F. C. Waterfield, 45th Sikhs, whom I had known for years. This promising officer was killed. His own regiment of Rattray’s Sikhs was the one Corps of the Indian Army which in my young days I had most admired and had served alongside in Afghanistan. It was always a fine battalion, and has on the plains of Mesopotamia added still more to its reputation. As I said earlier in this book, if any Sikh battalions are to remain as Class Corps, none is more worthy of this honour than Rattray’s Sikhs. On the 19th May the 15th Sikhs lost the services of two officers, Captain Crozier and Lieutenant Thomson. At dawn on 19th May I received orders to the effect that the Second and Seventh Divisions were consolidating their gains and that operations would continue on that day. The Artillery of the Indian Corps was to assist by firing on the Ferme du Bois and certain named communication trenches.