I will here cease for a while recording facts, and deal with matters which are of interest to those who look on the Indian Corps (minute as it was in comparison) as something else besides mere congeries of soldiers to feed the guns. There are some details which may not prove uninteresting to the student of psychology. By the end of May it was plain that the Indians needed a complete rest and sorting out, if they were to continue as a Corps. The losses in France after the May fighting had totalled up to: Killed. Wounded. Missing. British Officers 213 501 58 Indian Officers 88 260 53 Other Units, British 1,376 6,073 1,724 Other Units, Indian 1,943 10,650 2,504 ————— —————— ————— 3,620 17,484 4,321 In addition, 450 Indians had died from various causes. (Taken from _The Indian Corps in France_.) The above included the Territorial battalions forming part of the Corps, but not the losses of Divisions or Brigades temporarily attached. In my opinion it was useless to retain two Divisions in name without the substance, and I recommended that one strong Division with Brigades averaging 4000 rifles each should be formed, the weakest and some other named Indian battalions being turned into a Reserve Brigade from which casualties could be replaced. Also, should reinforcements prove larger than I anticipated, complete battalions could replace others, and thus give all an opportunity of sharing in the fighting. The Highland Division had just been allotted to us also, and the two combined Divisions would have formed a fine Army Corps. I explained that as matters then stood the British battalions were doing more than their share of work in the various fights. The quality of our Indian troops had deteriorated, as we received drafts of all sorts and kinds, and the old and tried British and Indian officers had been reduced to a minimum; but with that spirit that animates the sons of Britain, the British units, without complaint, continued to give of their best (and it was of the very best). Not that I did not occasionally receive hints from the officers of both British and Indian regiments that this process could not be indefinitely continued, and they had good reason too; and although I mostly kept my counsel I never failed to impress strongly on those in higher authority, that some drastic change was absolutely necessary. I recommended three Indian battalions being transferred from France, and gave my reasons in full. The two Divisional Commanders were in complete accord with me in these suggestions, and as a proof that they were necessary I will give a few instances of the composition of units, which those who know the Indian Army will appreciate.