"The enemy was thought to be anticipating an attack in these directions and every possible step was taken to strengthen his suspicions." On the 15th September the 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Margolin, D.S.O., arrived in the Jordan Valley, and took up its position on the Auja in support of the 38th Battalion in the line. A couple of days before the big offensive which began on the 18th September, General Allenby visited my Headquarters, where I presented to him all the officers not on duty. He took me a little apart and asked me if I was sure I could trust the men to fight, and I assured him that he need have no anxiety on that score, for the men were all right and would respond to any call when it was made. He then asked me if there was any other point I should like to bring to his notice: I told him that malaria was daily becoming more prevalent and I was losing 200 men a week from this cause alone: I also pointed out that I did not think that the medical arrangements for the evacuation and care of the men were all that they should be. The General made a note of this in his book. The only result was that I got an irate letter from the Deputy Adjutant-General asking me for a full report as to why I had misinformed the Commander-in-Chief about my sick, and about medical matters generally, so that on the morning of the 23rd September, the day we were ordered to pursue the enemy, when I should have been solely devoted to the leading of my men and all the problems pertaining thereto, I had to sit down and smooth the ruffled feathers of the Deputy Adjutant-General. I not only proved my case to the hilt, but emphasized it by giving further evidence which I had not troubled the Commander-in-Chief by recounting. General Chaytor specially warned us that, during the offensive on our left, we were to increase our patrols and harry the enemy as much as possible, to keep him in his lines and to prevent, if possible, any large force of Turks crossing from the East of the Jordan to reinforce their armies holding the line from the Jordan to the sea. This is how the official report runs:--"Chaytor's force in the Jordan Valley had so far confined itself to vigorous patrolling to insure that the enemy could make no move without their knowledge. The rôle of this composite force was to secure the right flank of the army and the Jordan crossings, to keep in close touch with the enemy and take advantage of any withdrawal on their part, but to run no risk of being involved with a more powerful foe too early in the battle. This difficult task was admirably carried out."