“After stating the circumstances of the marriage, the decree, and the refusal of the wife to cohabit, it states: ‘I therefore took my wife, and have since detained her in my house, using no more force or restraint than necessary to take her and keep her.’ That is the return which seeks to justify an admitted imprisonment of this lady. I do not know that I am able to express in sufficiently precise language the difference between ‘confinement’ and ‘imprisonment,’ but if there is any distinction, I can only say that upon these facts I should find an imprisonment, and looking at the return it is put as a broad proposition that the right of the husband, where there has been a wilful absenting of herself by the wife from her husband’s house—that it is his right to seize possession of his wife by force, and detain her in his house until she renders him conjugal rights. That is the proposition of law involved in the return, and I am not prepared to assent to it. The Legislature has expressly deprived the Matrimonial Court of the power of imprisoning the wife for refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and the result of such a system of law, if the husband had the power, would be that whereas the Court had no power to hand the wife over into her husband’s hands, but only to punish her for contempt by imprisonment under the control of the Court, and without any circumstances of injury or insult, and even that power was taken away, the husband might himself of his own motion seize and imprison her until she consented to the restitution of conjugal rights. That is the proposition I am called upon to establish by holding this return to be good. _I am of opinion that no such right or power exists in law. I am of opinion that no such right ever did exist in our law._ Whatever authorities may be quoted for any such proposition, it has always been subject to this condition: that where she has a complaint of, or is apprehensive of, ill-usage, the Court will never interfere to compel her to return to her husband’s custody. Now this brings me to the particular circumstances of this transaction. I am prepared to say that no English subject has a right to imprison another English subject (who is _sui juris_, and entitled to a judgment of his or her own) without any lawful authority, but if there were any qualification of that proposition I should be of opinion that on the facts of this case it would afford an ample justification to any Court for refusing to allow the husband in this case to retain the custody of his wife. “On these and other grounds the Lord Chancellor declared that the return of the writ was bad, and ordered that the lady be restored to her liberty, the other judges concurring.”—(“The Decision in the Clitheroe Case and its Consequences,” pp. 3, 4.)