I might close the inquiry at once by saying that no subsequent political moralist has brought us much further than Aristotle, but will glance at one or two interesting variations of the thesis in modern writers. In the time of Aristotle the shadow of Macedonia lay full on Athens, and, indeed, the whole of Greece was degenerating. Nor is it needful to glance at the literature of Rome, which produced no great thinker. The same problem of democracy and enfranchisement arose in Rome, but it was pushed aside by the founding of the Empire, and there is no serious discussion left for us to consider. In the Italian republics of the thirteenth century it arose again; but the republics were blotted out by empires or converted into principalities, and all political theorising was silenced by the general acceptance in Europe of the "divine right of kings." The successive Revolutions in France, and that gradual rise of class after class to claim a share in the political life, which I described in the last chapter, reopened the whole question. In the chaos of constitutions that were formed in different parts of Europe we see only grudging concessions to demands that had a show of force behind them. It was again incumbent on political moralists to seek a rational and just principle on which to determine the limits of enfranchisement, and I will briefly notice the chief efforts that have been made in this country to discover such a principle. Mr. Walter Bagehot made the most ingenious attempt to formulate a principle that should at once limit the franchise, yet retain the sacred characters of logic and justice. Nearly all English writers start from the supposed natural "rights of man"--the principle of Rousseau and the Revolutionists, which was still urged by advanced politicians. To this Bagehot replies that, if there is any such thing as an inherent right of man, it is at least limited by the fact that he has no right to injure his fellow-men. The limitation, in theory, is perfectly just. On that principle even the most advanced Radical disfranchises criminals and lunatics and illiterates, and requires a certain age in voters. It at once forces Mr. Bagehot to fall back on competency alone as the moral basis of enfranchisement. All shall vote who can do so competently: the incompetent shall not vote, as it would mean injustice to their fellows. Mr. Bagehot draws up the principle: "A man has a right to so much political power as he can exercise without impeding any other who would more fitly exercise political power." The curious wording of the principle is, of course, due to a desire to prevent the mass of the workers or middle class from swamping the vote of the wealthy. But as it is only on the ground of their presumed greater culture and competence that Mr. Bagehot tampers with his franchise to favour the wealthy, and as the general growth of education has materially altered the situation, I need not go into the details of his electoral scheme.