The first woman since the days of Mistress Brent to ask for and obtain admission to the bar of this country was Arabella A. Mansfield of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa. She studied in a law office and was admitted to the Iowa bar in June, 1869, under a statute providing only for admission of “white male citizens.” The examining committee in its report, which is of record, said: “Your committee have examined the provisions of section 2700 of chapter 114, of the Revision of 1860, concerning the qualifications of attorneys and counselors in this State [section 2700 provided for the admission of “white male persons.” Ed.], but in considering the section in connection with division 3 of section 29, chapter 3 of the Revision, on construction of statutes [section 29 provided that “words importing the masculine gender only may be extended to females.” ED.], we feel justified in recommending to the court that construction which we deem authorized, not only by the language of the law itself, but by the demands and necessities of the present time and occasion. Your committee take unusual pleasure in recommending the admission of Mrs. Mansfield, not only because she is the first lady who has applied for this authority in this State, but because in her examination she has given the very best rebuke possible to the imputation that ladies cannot qualify for the practice of law.” At the time of Mrs. Mansfield’s debut into the profession without opposition, Myra Bradwell, of Chicago, having studied law under the instruction of her husband, ex-Judge James B. Bradwell, was unsuccessfully knocking at the door of the Supreme Court of Illinois for admission. To give an understanding of the case, and line of argument used in denying her application, we extract from the opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Lawrence, the following: “Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied for a license as an attorney at law, presenting the ordinary certificates of character and qualifications. The license was refused, and it was stated, as a sufficient reason, that under the decisions of this court, the applicant, as a married woman, would be bound neither by her express contracts, nor by those implied contracts, which it is the policy of the law to create between attorney and client.