Napoleon to Fouché on April 13th, "have for authors a few gossips of Paris, who are simply blockheads. Never has the position of France been grander or finer. As to Eylau, I have said and resaid that the bulletin exaggerated the loss; and, for a great battle, what are 2000 men slain? There were none of the battles of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. which did not cost more. When I lead back my army to France and across the Rhine, it will be seen that there are not many wanting at the roll-call." It was against Russia and against the vigor of its resistance that Napoleon now concentrated all his efforts. Tardy hostilities had at length commenced between the Porte and Russia. For a moment the Sultan had appeared to hesitate before the demands of the English, united to those of the Russians: Admiral Duckworth forced the Dardanelles at the head of a squadron, and destroyed the Turkish division anchored at Cape Nagara. In spite of the terror which reigned in Constantinople, the energetic influence of General Sebastiani carried the day. The overtures of the English Legation were repulsed; the capital was armed all of a sudden, under the direction of French officers. When Admiral Duckworth appeared before the place, he found it in good condition of defence; thus the English squadron could not leave the Straits of the Dardanelles without sustaining serious damage. For the British navy the evil was small; the moral effect could not but have some influence. The Emperor Napoleon sought to profit by this circumstance to enter afresh into negotiations with Austria. On the day after the battle of Eylau he sent General Bertrand to the King of Prussia, offering to surrender him his States as far as the Elbe. The messenger was charged with the significant insinuation: "You will give just a hint that as to Poland, since the emperor has become acquainted with it, he attaches to it no value." The sacrifice of a fourth of the Prussian monarchy seemed too bitter for King Frederick William; he replied to the envoy with evasive answers. Napoleon became disdainful as regards the Prussians. It was with Austria that he determined henceforth to treat concerning the affairs of Prussia. "See now my plan, and what you must say to M. de Vincent," wrote he on March 9, 1807, to Talleyrand: "To restore to the King of Prussia his throne and his estates, and to maintain the integrity of the Porte. As to Poland, that will be found included in the first part of the sentence. If these bases of peace suit Austria, we shall be able to understand each other. As for the remark of M. de Vincent, that Prussia is too thoroughly humiliated to hope for recovery, that is reasonable. The end of all this will be an arrangement between France and Austria, or between France and Russia; for there will be no repose for the people, who need it so much, except by this union."