It is extremely painful to have to prove the injustice of a course which is naturally dear to us. That is bitterly felt at every step during the long years of the war of Spain, in presence of the generous efforts of a people who, with arms in their hands, vindicated their national liberty and independence. The first outbursts of the Spanish insurrection showed this with a brilliancy that soon partially disappeared. The efforts of the English their courage and feats of arms, were soon to eclipse to some extent the obstinate animosity of the Spanish. The long series of checks which began on Napoleon's arrival was sufficient to prove with what a decisive weight the alliance which they were soon to conclude with Great Britain weighed in the balance of their destinies. Setting out from Paris on the 29th October, the emperor, on arriving at Bayonne, showed great anger at the delay in the preparations, the bad state of the roads and the shortness of supplies. "You will see how disgracefully I am served," he wrote to General Dejean, in charge of the war administration. "I have only 7000 cloaks instead of 50,000; 15,000 pairs of shoes instead of 129,000. I am in want of everything; my army is naked, and yet we are entering on a campaign. Yet I have spent a great deal of money, which is so much thrown into the sea." Napoleon's displeasure was not diminished when he reached Vittoria. He had beforehand forbidden the attempt upon Madrid which King Joseph proposed to him, mistrusting his brother's military skill. "The military art is an art the principles of which must never be violated," he wrote, in some observations of great sense and force. "To change one's line of operation is an operation of genius; to lose it, is an operation so serious that it constitutes a crime in the general who is guilty of it. If, before taking Madrid, organizing the army there, with military stores for eight or ten days, and providing sufficient supplies, one had just been defeated, what would become of that army? where could they rally? where transport their wounded? whence draw their war supplies, having nothing but provisions for a short time? We need say no more; those who have the courage to advise such a measure would be the first to lose their head so soon as the result proved the madness of their procedure. With an army entirely composed of men like those of the guard and commanded by the most able general-- Alexander or Caesar, if they could act with such folly--one could answer for nothing; much more therefore in the circumstances in which the army of Spain is placed. In war everything depends on opinion--opinion as to the enemy, opinion as to one's own soldiers. When a battle is lost, the difference between the conquered and the conqueror is but trifling; yet opinion makes it immeasurable, because two or three squadrons are then sufficient to produce a great effect. Nothing has been done to give