General Townshend advanced on Bagdad with less than a division of mixed
Anglo-Indian troops--some 16,000 to 20,000 strong. At Ctesiphon he found
a Turkish army of four divisions, with two others in reserve, awaiting
him. After a two days' indecisive battle, Townshend, recognizing he had
insufficient forces, retired on his forward base at Kut-el-Amara. The
Arabs in the neighborhood awaited the issue of the battle, ready to take
sides, for the time being, with the winner.
[Sidenote: The Turks much stronger in numbers.]
[Sidenote: Secret of European success in Asia.]
It says much for the stamina of this composite division that, although
opposed throughout by five or six times their number of Turks and
Turkish irregulars, the latter were unable to overwhelm them. To the
Western mind, unacquainted with the mentality and moral weakness of the
Moslem under certain circumstances, this may appear a most foolhardy
adventure. To the Anglo-Indian the most obvious thing to do when in a
tight corner is to go for the enemy no matter what their numbers. All
Europeans in India develop an extraordinary pride in race, and an
inherent contempt for numbers. It is the secret of their success there.
Most Moslems fight well when posted behind strong natural defenses. In
open country, such as Mesopotamia, they do not show to so much
advantage. Another trait is that when their line of retreat is
threatened they are more timorous than European troops. This weakness
will have important bearings on the future of the campaign on the Tigris
Valley, because the communications of the Turks are threatened by the
Russians far in their rear and in more than one place.
[Sidenote: Kut-el-Amara of great strategical importance.]
Townshend's camp at Kut-el-Amara is well supplied with stores and
munitions, and will soon be relieved. When his retreat was cut off at
the bend of the Tigris River he could still have retired safely by
following the Shat-el-Hai to Nasiriyeh. There was no thought, however,
of retreat, Kut-el-Amara is geographically of great strategical
importance, and the British garrison there has served the useful purpose
of detaining large forces of the enemy where it was desired they should
remain while important Allied developments were taking place in their
flank and rear. Most of these Turkish reinforcements were withdrawn from
Armenia when the depth of winter appeared to make it impossible for the
Russians to break through the lofty hills of Caucasia.
[Sidenote: Turks deceived by rumor about Grand Duke Nicholas.]
[Sidenote: The Grand Duke's strategy.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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