The Turkish Army in Southern Palestine held a strong position extending from the sea at Gaza, roughly along the main Gaza-Beersheba Road to Beersheba. Gaza had been made into a strong modern fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, offering every facility for protracted defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Baha group, the Abu Hareira-Arab el Teeaha trench system, and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1,500 to 2,000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about 4 1/2 miles. [Sidenote: Turks have good communications.] The enemy's force was on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about 30 miles; but his lateral communications were good, and any threatened point of the line could be very quickly reinforced. My force was extended on a front of 22 miles, from the sea, opposite Gaza, to Gamli. [Sidenote: Lack of water on the British front.] Owing to lack of water I was unable, without preparations which would require some considerable time, to approach within striking distance of the enemy, except in the small sector near the sea coast opposite Gaza. My proposals received the approval of the War Cabinet, and preparations were undertaken to enable the plan I had formed to be put into execution. [Sidenote: To strike on Turk's left flank.] I had decided to strike the main blow against the left flank of the main Turkish position, Hareira and Sheria. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary to this operation, in order to secure the water supplies at that place and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which direction I intended to attack the Hareira-Sheria line. [Sidenote: Necessary to take Beersheba.] This front of attack was chosen for the following reasons. The enemy's works in this sector were less formidable than elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the enemy's defences. When Beersheba was in our hands we should have an open flank against which to operate, and I could make full use of our superiority in mounted troops, and a success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage and forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no other line of attack would afford. [Sidenote: Attacked Gaza to deceive enemy.] [Sidenote: Assurance of naval cooperation at Gaza.]