The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the Park north-west of WYTSCHAETE. After a whole day's fighting the 34th Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south of WYTSCHAETE. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north, and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park of WYTSCHAETE was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is a legend connected with WYTSCHAETE Park, and the scene was worthy of it.[95] The 26th Infantry Division during these days had advanced its lines to the western slopes of the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge, and in places across the valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, as the British on Mount KEMMEL were able to watch every movement in our trenches, and could immediately bring them under the fire of field or heavy artillery, or even of long-range naval guns, and they were by no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately our losses were for the most part only in the front lines, but our shortage of ammunition compelled us to husband it.[96] Owing to the conformation of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, we were unable to range accurately on the enemy's artillery, and the most we could do was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their observation posts on Mount KEMMEL were soon discovered, and the fight now began against the observers there as well as against those posted in the towers of YPRES. So the blame must not be laid on us for the gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of YPRES, which gave such a fine view of the whole countryside. Further to the south no noteworthy progress was made either by the Cavalry Corps, or on the front of the Sixth Army. Such then was the general situation when, on the 10th November, the new forces lay ready to take the offensive in their positions north of the COMINES-YPRES canal. Before going further, however, the operations of the Fourth Army from the last days of October must for a moment be touched on. THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1914