Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under General von Fabeck was engaged in the heavy fighting just described, the Fourth Army of Duke Albert of Würtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means of constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from withdrawing any troops from his front to support his endangered positions near YPRES. By 11 A.M. on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German forces rendered necessary by the inundation of the front between the coast and DIXMUDE had been sufficiently completed to enable an offensive to be delivered on this day, on the line DIXMUDE-GHELUVELT. The right flank, from DIXMUDE to the coast, was secured by the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade, 4th _Ersatz_ Division, and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the orders of the general officer commanding the XXII Reserve Corps. The dispositions of the attacking troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve Corps in the sector NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE; the III Reserve Corps, including the 44th Reserve Division, on both sides of LANGEMARCK, facing the front HET SAS-ST. JULIEN (this was the most important group in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were to the south again, with the left flank resting on the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road.[97] By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps had been able to gain ground at and north of BIXSCHOOTE, while the 5th Reserve Division advancing from the north had forced its way close up to the western edge of LANGEMARCK. But all our efforts to capture this place by attacks from north and east, in spite of reinforcements being brought up, failed. It became evident that the enemy's skilfully placed and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired infantry positions in a country so favourable for defence, were more than a match for our guns, especially at a time when ammunition was scarce, and the misty weather prevented observation from aeroplanes. A continuation of the offensive here would only have meant a useless sacrifice of life. It was therefore decided with deep regret to resort to the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to hold the enemy. The situation of the Fourth Army indeed was no enviable one. Here in the plains of Flanders, operations were effected by the November weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country east and south of YPRES. The troops had to endure great hardships; their trenches rapidly filled with water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give insufficient protection against artillery fire. In several places they had to be evacuated altogether, and the men lay out in the open with only a hastily constructed wire entanglement in front to secure them against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most difficult in this water-logged district. Frequently it could only be carried on by piling up sand-bag parapets, and these being easily seen by the enemy were promptly shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular reliefs