As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in the short period available after they were called up the volunteers had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to Russia to fight under the great victor of TANNENBURG were much envied. The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of a final decision at YPRES had disappeared. The first battle of YPRES was a German victory,[116] for it marked the failure of the enemy's intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium (thus preventing us from making use of their valuable resources), and to use the YPRES area as a base for the Belgian, French and British advance on the RHINE. The Belgian coast was now firmly in our possession, and offered a good starting-place for naval operations against England. But we had not succeeded in making the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in the west in our favour during 1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only natural that the German General Staff found it difficult thoroughly to realise this unpleasant fact, and only did so with reluctance; but endeavour has been made in this account to bring out the main reasons which led to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, great things had been accomplished. The Army of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance and determined attack, had prevented the big offensive planned by the enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies together had forced a superior opponent into the defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the sea to his assistance, had driven him back continually, until positions had been reached which enabled German troops to be spared to carry out an offensive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of the Marne, so now the spectre of a Russian invasion appeared threateningly before the German Nation, and the whole country knew what it would mean if it should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern Front were far too weak,