[111] _The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon 11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek was trifling in extent and value, and though 'Hill 60' and the wood north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt that the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been expected to produce a break-through. The 'numerical superiority' once again attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged strength of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost wholly lacking supporting points and communications, which had such a much more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they ever possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the German Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the honours of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three weeks of incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous troops._ [112] _This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November in which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage Château fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered by the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of the Château. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks._ [113] _The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this._ [114] _One reason why the G.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on 17th November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on this day by his 4th Division, but the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades, holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision._ [115] _It was the U-boats that came to a speedy end._ [116] _See remarks in Introduction._ [117] _The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have been mentioned._ [118] _It is not to be read in this monograph. See Introduction._ [119] _4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see page 64)._ [120] _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions (see page 90)._ INDEX ALBERT OF WÜRTEMBURG, Duke, 6; _see also_ ARMY, FOURTH. ANTWERP: value of, to Entente, 3; capture of, 5; retreat from, 7 (_note_). ARMY, FOURTH (German): formation of, 6; advance of, through BELGIUM, 19; dispositions on 20th Oct., 20; task of, 25, 27; attack on 3rd Nov., 98; attack on 10th Nov., 104; order of battle of, 131.