General McClellan answered that he was considering the matter, but that instant action was impossible, although he hoped that he would soon be able to decide what ought to be done. The committee asked what time he would require to reach a decision. He replied that it depended upon circumstances; that he would not give his consent to have the troops about Washington sent over to the Virginia side of the Potomac without having their rear protected more fully, and better lines of retreat open; that he designed throwing a temporary bridge across the river as soon as possible, and making a permanent structure of it at his leisure. That would make three bridges, and then the requisite precautions would be completed. Mr. Wade replied, with great impatience, that with 150,000 of the best troops the world ever saw, there was no need of more bridges; that the rebels were inferior in numbers and condition, and that retreat would be treason. "These 150,000 men," Mr. Wade said, "could whip the whole Confederacy if they were given a chance; if I was their commander I would lead them across the Potomac, and they should not come back until they had won a victory and the war was ended, or they came in their coffins." Mr. Wade spoke strongly and plainly throughout the interview, and the Secretary of War endorsed every word he uttered. The committee had another conference with Secretary Stanton on the following day at his residence, at which it was decided that they should co-operate with him in an effort to persuade President Lincoln either to displace McClellan or to compel him to commence an active campaign at once. On the 25th of February this conference with the President was held, and it was followed by others, Senators Chandler and Wade finally threatening to make the laggardness of the commander of the Army of the Potomac a subject of debate in the Senate, and to offer a resolution directing the President to order an advance forthwith. The first result was what the committee were so anxious to accomplish. In March, the armies commenced to move, and McClellan, at last taking the field in person, pushed out to Centreville, and then followed up this delayed advance by his flank movement to the Peninsula, driving the rebels out of Yorktown by a month's work with the shovel, and following General Johnston up to Williamsburg, where a bloody victory was won, but its fruits were left ungathered. This campaign was short, bloody, and blundering, ending with the battle of Malvern Hill, which was also deprived of its proper importance by McClellan's failure to follow up his advantage with a prompt advance upon Richmond, and which thus in the end amounted to but little more than another Union reverse. Mr. Chandler always firmly believed that had McClellan moved toward the rebel capital and not toward his gunboats after Malvern Hill, the war would have been shortened by two years.