In 1873 the bubble of an irredeemable currency, inflated prices, and wild speculation burst in the United States, and the era of universal shrinkage, commercial collapse, and industrial stagnation began. The financial condition of the government and the people at once became the absorbing topic of public discussion, and for five years the questions connected with the currency and the national credit were those which most completely absorbed popular attention. Mr. Chandler's share in the prolonged controversy over the financial problem was a conspicuous one; he came into it equipped with clear ideas and a consistent record; he contended for the causes of rational finance and public honesty without wavering in the face of the strongest opposition, and without any departure from sound doctrine; and he saw the courage and persistence of those with whom he acted finally rewarded by the enlightenment of the people, the restoration of a convertible currency, and the raising of the credit of the United States to the highest standard. For obvious reasons his record upon all the phases of "the financial question" can be most satisfactorily treated in a single chapter. That record will show that he began at a point to which many other public men were brought only by years of education, and it well illustrates the clearness of his conceptions of the principles underlying questions connected with what may be called the practical departments of statesmanship. Not the least of the difficulties, which at the outset confronted the administration of Abraham Lincoln, was the fact that the public treasury was empty and the national credit impaired. In October, 1860, the government had contracted a five per cent. loan of $7,000,000 at a small premium; four months later, a six per cent. loan had been sold with difficulty at about ninety cents on the dollar. It was true, by way of offset, that the country was in a generally prosperous condition. The commercial wrecks of 1857 had disappeared, crops were abundant, and general business had become again remunerative. This was an element of national strength, but it was not a quickly available resource. War meant large immediate expenditure, for which the means must be promptly provided. There was no time to create and organize upon an extensive scale the machinery of direct taxation, and some doubts were then felt as to whether the people would not grow restive under any general imposition of new burdens. The entire stock of coin in the North was estimated at but about $121,000,000, while the paper money in existence was exclusively composed of the notes of state banks organized under diverse and often insecure systems, and much of it circulated only at a discount. This condition of the currency created the fear that the rapid negotiation of large government loans could not be accomplished without the serious derangement of the money market; the withdrawal of considerable sums from circulation, even